Free will, grace, and anti-Pelagianism

  title={Free will, grace, and anti-Pelagianism},
  author={Taylor W. Cyr and Matthew Todd Flummer},
  journal={International Journal for Philosophy of Religion},
Critics of synergism often complain that the view entails Pelagianism (or at least semi-Pelagianism), and so, critics think, monergism looks like the only live (orthodox) option. Critics of monergism often claim that the view entails that the blame for human sin ultimately traces to God. Recently, several philosophers (including Richard Cross, Eleonore Stump, and Kevin Timpe) have attempted to chart a middle path by offering soteriological accounts which are monergistic (and thus avoid… 

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