Free Riding on Enforcement in the World Trade Organization

@article{Johns2018FreeRO,
  title={Free Riding on Enforcement in the World Trade Organization},
  author={Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  year={2018},
  volume={80},
  pages={873 - 889}
}
Many policies that appear to violate WTO rules remain unchallenged, even as they have a significant economic impact. Why is this? We argue that the likelihood that a country challenges a protectionist policy is linked to how concentrated or diffuse that policy is. When it is concentrated, litigation is a private good. But when a policy is diffuse, affecting many states, litigation is a public good and countries face a collective action problem: each country seeks to free ride on others… Expand
The Globalization of Production and the Politics of Dispute Initiation at the World Trade Organization
The aim of this article is to show how the degree of integration into so‐called global value chains (GVCs) affects World Trade Organization (WTO) members’ decision to initiate a dispute at the WTO.Expand
Judicial economy and moving bars in international investment arbitration
Historically, international investment law has centered on protecting foreign investors from direct expropriation, but much of modern law includes legal standards that allow investors to winExpand
International Investment Law and Foreign Direct Reinvestment
Abstract One goal of the law is to provide a means to return disputing parties to cooperation. The prevailing expectation is that international investment law largely does not do this; rather, anExpand
How a Retreat from Global Economic Governance May Empower Business Interests
After decades of broad, bipartisan support for global economic integration, US politics has been shaken by a backlash against global economic governance. The promise of internationally derived gainsExpand
The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law:
International organizations (IOs) play a vital role in enforcing international law. I argue that collective-action problems and the design of legal-standing rules drive decisions about whether to e...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 56 REFERENCES
Fear of Crowds in WTO Disputes: Why Don't More Countries Participate?
The participation deficit in global governance is usually blamed on power politics; we argue it may actually reflect strategic behavior by excluded countries themselves. In the WTO, member-statesExpand
What Is Litigation in the World Trade Organization Worth?
Conventional wisdom holds that the creation of international, court-like institutions helps countries to peacefully settle trade conflicts, thereby enhancing overall welfare. Many have argued,Expand
Do International Rulings Have Spillover Effects?: The View from Financial Markets
How influential are international courts? Can their rulings reach beyond a given case and affect the behavior of countries not party to the dispute? International law is clear on the matter: rulingsExpand
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties and Free Riders
What affects a country's decision of whether to formally engage in a trade dispute directly related to its exporting interests? This article empirically examines determinants of affected countryExpand
Low-income developing countries and WTO litigation: Why wake up the sleeping dog?
ABSTRACT The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has workedExpand
Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes
Abstract If international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize procompliance domestic audiences, as many existing theories argue, why do countries wait so long before soundingExpand
What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes?
Abstract The treatment of foreign investment has become the most controversial issue in global governance. At the center of the controversy lies the mechanism of investor-state dispute settlementExpand
Does Legal Capacity Matter? Explaining Dispute Initiation and Antidumping actions in the WTO
Does legal capacity matter in the World Trade Organization (WTO)? The conventional wisdom is that the “right perseveres over might” under the WTO’s more legalistic dispute settlement system. Yet,Expand
Gravitation or discrimination? Determinants of litigation in the World Trade Organisation
The strong presence of large countries in World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement and the absence of very poor ones have raised concerns that increasing legalisation in the global tradingExpand
Strengthening International Courts: The Hidden Costs of Legalization
As all manner of commerce becomes increasingly global, states must establish laws to protect property rights, human rights, and national security. In many cases, states delegate authority to resolveExpand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...