Free Riding on Enforcement in the World Trade Organization

  title={Free Riding on Enforcement in the World Trade Organization},
  author={Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={873 - 889}
Many policies that appear to violate WTO rules remain unchallenged, even as they have a significant economic impact. Why is this? We argue that the likelihood that a country challenges a protectionist policy is linked to how concentrated or diffuse that policy is. When it is concentrated, litigation is a private good. But when a policy is diffuse, affecting many states, litigation is a public good and countries face a collective action problem: each country seeks to free ride on others… 
8 Citations

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