Framing effects as violations of extensionality

@article{BourgeoisGironde2009FramingEA,
  title={Framing effects as violations of extensionality},
  author={Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde and Rapha{\"e}l Giraud},
  journal={Theory and Decision},
  year={2009},
  volume={67},
  pages={385-404}
}
Framing effects occur when different descriptions of the same decision problem give rise to divergent decisions. They can be seen as a violation of the decision-theoretic version of the principle of extensionality (PE). The PE in logic means that two logically equivalent sentences can be substituted salva veritate. We explore what this notion of extensionality becomes in decision contexts. Violations of extensionality may have rational grounds. Based on some ideas proposed by the psychologist… 

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