• Corpus ID: 218684569

Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the Full Preference Domain

@article{Yu2020FractionalTT,
  title={Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the Full Preference Domain},
  author={Jingsheng Yu and Jun Zhang},
  journal={arXiv: Theoretical Economics},
  year={2020}
}
  • Jingsheng YuJun Zhang
  • Published 19 May 2020
  • Economics
  • arXiv: Theoretical Economics
Efficiency and fairness are two desiderata in market design. Fairness requires randomization in many environments. Observing the inadequacy of Top Trading Cycle (TTC) to incorporate randomization, Yu and Zhang (2020) propose the class of Fractional TTC mechanisms to solve random allocation problems efficiently and fairly. The assumption of strict preferences in the paper restricts the application scope. This paper extends Fractional TTC to the full preference domain in which agents can be… 

Fractional Top Trading Cycle

This work proposes a class of Fractional TTC mechanisms to solve random allocation problems efficiently and fairly and applies them to a couple of market design problems and obtains efficient and fair assignments in all of them.

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