Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms

  title={Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms},
  author={Kai Quek},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={537 - 549}
  • Kai Quek
  • Published 19 January 2021
  • Economics
  • American Political Science Review
Two mechanisms of costly signaling are known in international relations: sinking costs and tying hands. I show that there exist four mechanisms of costly signaling that are equally general. I develop the new mechanisms of installment costs and reducible costs and contrast them with sunk costs and tied-hands costs. I then conduct experiments to test the four signaling mechanisms. I find that each mechanism can improve credibility when the costs are high, but reducible costs can improve… 
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