Formal verification of information flow security for a simple arm-based separation kernel

@inproceedings{Dam2013FormalVO,
  title={Formal verification of information flow security for a simple arm-based separation kernel},
  author={Mads Dam and Roberto Guanciale and Narges Khakpour and Hamed Nemati and Oliver Schwarz},
  booktitle={ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  year={2013}
}
A separation kernel simulates a distributed environment using a single physical machine by executing partitions in isolation and appropriately controlling communication among them. We present a formal verification of information flow security for a simple separation kernel for ARMv7. Previous work on information flow kernel security leaves communication to be handled by model-external means, and cannot be used to draw conclusions when there is explicit interaction between partitions. We propose… CONTINUE READING
Highly Cited
This paper has 66 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

Citations

Publications citing this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 38 extracted citations

67 Citations

0102030'13'14'15'16'17'18
Citations per Year
Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 67 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…