Formal verification of an extension of a secure , compatible UNIX file system

@inproceedings{Cristi2002FormalVO,
  title={Formal verification of an extension of a secure , compatible UNIX file system},
  author={Maximiliano Cristi{\'a}},
  year={2002}
}
We specify and formally verify security properties of an extension of a UNIX file system. Extensions include a multi-level security model, ACLs, separate MAC and DAC administration, and others. The security properties we verified are: simple security and confinement as defined in the Bell and LaPadula security model [3, 4], the standard DAC policy for ACLs, and a security policy for the administration of security attributes. Both, formalization and verification were done using Coq. 

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