# Formal Verification of Side-channel Countermeasures via Elementary Circuit Transformations

@article{Coron2017FormalVO,
title={Formal Verification of Side-channel Countermeasures via Elementary Circuit Transformations},
author={Jean-S{\'e}bastien Coron},
journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
year={2017},
volume={2017},
pages={879}
}
• J. Coron
• Published 2 July 2018
• Computer Science, Mathematics
• IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
We describe a technique to formally verify the security of masked implementations against side-channel attacks, based on elementary circuit transforms. We describe two complementary approaches: a generic approach for the formal verification of any circuit, but for small attack orders only, and a specialized approach for the verification of specific circuits, but at any order. We also show how to generate security proofs automatically, for simple circuits. We describe the implementation of…
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