Formal Reasoning About the Security of Amazon Web Services

@inproceedings{Cook2018FormalRA,
  title={Formal Reasoning About the Security of Amazon Web Services},
  author={Byron Cook},
  booktitle={International Conference on Computer Aided Verification},
  year={2018}
}
  • B. Cook
  • Published in
    International Conference on…
    14 July 2018
  • Computer Science
We report on the development and use of formal verification tools within Amazon Web Services (AWS) to increase the security assurance of its cloud infrastructure and to help customers secure themselves. We also discuss some remaining challenges that could inspire future research in the community. 

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