Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics

  title={Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics},
  author={Scott Gehlbach and Konstantin Sonin and Milan W. Svolik},
  journal={Political Institutions: Non-Democratic Regimes eJournal},
The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game-theoretic modeling of its various aspects: regime persistence and breakdown, ruling-coalition formation and leadership change, protests and repression, formal institutions and elections, and censorship and media control. We review this research agenda, focusing on the foundational assumptions and political intuition… 

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