Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism

  title={Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism},
  author={Cory J Clark and Bo M. Winegard and R. Baumeister},
  journal={Frontiers in Psychology},
For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged. The present work provides one potential explanation for these discrepant findings: People are strongly motivated to preserve free will and moral responsibility, and thus do not have stable, logically rigorous notions of free will. Seven studies support this hypothesis by demonstrating that a… Expand
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The debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by ‘free will’, a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yieldedExpand
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Compatibilism can be natural
  • J. Turri
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Consciousness and Cognition
  • 2017
Six experiments are presented that provide the best evidence to date for natural compatibilism, avoiding the main methodological problems faced by previous work supporting the view. Expand
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One debate in the experimental exploration of everyday judgments about free will is whether most people are compatibilists or incompatibilists. Some recent research suggests that many people who haveExpand
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Philosophers working in the nascent field of ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun using methods borrowed from psychology to collect data about folk intuitions concerning debates ranging from actionExpand
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