Foreign Policy as Pork-barrel Spending: Incentives for Legislator Credit Claiming on Foreign Aid

  title={Foreign Policy as Pork-barrel Spending: Incentives for Legislator Credit Claiming on Foreign Aid},
  author={Tobias Heinrich and Timothy M. Peterson},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={1418 - 1442}
Foreign policy often creates geographically concentrated domestic benefits. A prominent example is the tying of development aid to purchases from the donor country. This feature of aid highlights the utility in examining foreign policy as an instance of pork-barrel politics. Considering tied aid in terms of legislators’ incentives to provide constituent benefits, we argue that people will support an increase in foreign aid spending more when it would promote local economic activity, while… Expand
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