• Corpus ID: 1182

@article{Singh2007ForprofitMI,
author={Sudhir Kumar Singh and Vwani P. Roychowdhury and Himawan Gunadhi and Behnam Attaran Rezaei},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2007},
volume={abs/0707.1057}
}
• Published 6 July 2007
• Economics
• ArXiv
A mediator is a well-known construct in game theory, and is an entity that plays on behalf of some of the agents who choose to use its services, while the rest of the agents participate in the game directly. We initiate a game theoretic study of sponsored search auctions, such as those used by Google and Yahoo!, involving {\em incentive driven} mediators. We refer to such mediators as {\em for-profit} mediators, so as to distinguish them from mediators introduced in prior work, who have no…

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