For Love or Money? The Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage

@article{Alm1999ForLO,
  title={For Love or Money? The Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage},
  author={James Alm and Leslie A. Whittington},
  journal={Economica},
  year={1999},
  volume={66},
  pages={297-316}
}
There is a large empirical literature that demonstrates the importance of economic factors in the decision to marry. Taxes, however, have been largely overlooked as a determinant of marriage, even though the tax system in the United States is not marriage-neutral; that is, when two individuals marry, their marital income tax burden is typically different--sometimes higher, sometimes lower--than their combined single income tax obligations. In this paper we explore the impact of the federal… 

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