Corpus ID: 16823949

Following the White Rabbit : Software attacks against Intel ( R ) VT-d technology

@inproceedings{Wojtczuk2011FollowingTW,
  title={Following the White Rabbit : Software attacks against Intel ( R ) VT-d technology},
  author={Rafal Wojtczuk and J. Rutkowska},
  year={2011}
}
We discuss three software attacks that might allow for escaping from a VT-d-protected driver domain in a virtualization system. We then focus on one of those attacks, and demonstrate practical and reliable code execution exploit against a Xen system. Finally, we discuss how new hardware from Intel offers a potential for protection against our attacks in the form of Interrupt Remapping (for client systems available only on the very latest Sandy Bridge processors). But we also discuss how this… Expand
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