Folk psychology’ is not folk psychology

  title={Folk psychology’ is not folk psychology},
  author={Matthew Ratcliffe},
  journal={Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  • M. Ratcliffe
  • Published 13 June 2006
  • Psychology
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an… 
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