Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects

@article{Arico2010FolkPC,
  title={Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects},
  author={Adam Arico},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  year={2010},
  volume={1},
  pages={371-393}
}
  • Adam Arico
  • Published 16 April 2010
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires. Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental… 
Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness
In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very
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It is not uncommon to find assumptions being made about folk psychology in the discussions of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind. In this article I consider one example, focusing on what
Attributions of consciousness.
  • J. Sytsma
  • Philosophy
    Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science
  • 2014
TLDR
The philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness is discussed and the work that has been done on the question of whether lay people have this concept is detailed, exploring how people understand and attribute those mental states that have been thought to be phenomenally conscious.
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We evaluate the role of embodiment in ordinary mental state ascriptions. Presented are five experiments on phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts and spirits. Results
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  • Robert D. Rupert
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
  • 2019
It is often claimed that structured collections of individuals with mental or cognitive states—such collections as courts, countries, and corporations—have mental or cognitive states of their own.
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