Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects

@article{Arico2010FolkPC,
  title={Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects},
  author={Adam Arico},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  year={2010},
  volume={1},
  pages={371-393}
}
  • Adam Arico
  • Published 16 April 2010
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires. Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental… 

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