Flexible imitation suppresses epidemics through better vaccination

  title={Flexible imitation suppresses epidemics through better vaccination},
  author={Soya Miyoshi and Marko Jusup and Petter Holme},
  journal={Journal of Computational Social Science},
  pages={709 - 720}
The decision of whether or not to vaccinate is a complex one. It involves the contribution both to a social good—herd immunity—and to one’s own well-being. It is informed by social influence, personal experience, education, and mass media. In our work, we investigate a situation in which individuals make their choice based on how social neighbourhood responded to previous epidemics. We do this by proposing a minimalistic model using components from game theory, network theory and the modelling… 
1 Citations



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