Fiscal federalism and incentives in a Russian reg

  title={Fiscal federalism and incentives in a Russian reg},
  author={Michael Alexeeva and Galina Kurlyandskayab},
  • Michael Alexeeva, Galina Kurlyandskayab
  • Published 2003
Transfers from a higher-level government budget may affect the incentives of lower-lever g ments to foster their tax base. If transfers offset completely changes in owned budgetary re fiscal incentives are destroyed. Using the data from a Russian region, we cannot reject the hy that transfers offset completely changes in municipal revenues, although the transfers are with a lag. The estimates suggest that this transfers policy is due in part to short time horiz regional governments and… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures and tables from this paper.


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 16 references

Transforming the Core: Restructuring Industrial Ente

Ernst, Maurice, +3 authors Paul
Russia. IMF Staff Papers • 1996
View 1 Excerpt
Highly Influenced

Central control of regional budgets: Theory with applications to Russia

Litwack, M John
Jou Comparative Economics • 2002

Local government in the R Federation

Kurlyandskaya, Galina, +3 authors Natalia
Local Government and Public Service Reform Ini Developing New Rules in the Old Environment • 2002
View 1 Excerpt

Econometric Analysis, 4th edition

Rossii, Moscow, Russia. Greene, H William
Prentice–Hall, Upper Saddle River, • 2000

Subnational Budgeting in Russia: Preempting a P

Freinkman, Lev, +3 authors Daniel
Russia and Central Europe. Westview Press, • 1999
View 1 Excerpt

Second tier’ fiscal federalism: Budgetary relations

Alexeev, Michael, Kurlyandskaya, Galina

Federalism as a commitment to preserving

Qian, Yingyi, +3 authors R Barry
View 1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…