Fiscal Federalism, State Lobbying and Discretionary Finance: Evidence from India

@article{Biswas2010FiscalFS,
  title={Fiscal Federalism, State Lobbying and Discretionary Finance: Evidence from India},
  author={R. Biswas and S. Marjit and V. Marimoutou},
  journal={PSN: Development Strategies (Topic)},
  year={2010}
}
In the quasi-federal democratic polity that India has, lobbying for central funds by the states is often done in a subliminal fashion. Hence, it becomes difficult to get an account of how much lobbying has been done to a particular end. Our paper attempts at constructing certain political proxy variables to quantify the extent of such lobbying in India. We quantify lobbying through the ministerial representation in the council of ministers. We also use several time and state dummies to account… Expand

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