• DOI:10.2307/2331397
Corpus ID: 154447889

Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders

@article{Agrawal1996FirmPA,
  title={Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders},
  author={A. Agrawal and C. R. Knoeber},
  journal={Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
  year={1996},
  volume={31},
  pages={377-397}
}

A. Agrawal, C. R. Knoeber

Published 1996

Economics

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders; use of outside directors; debt policy; the managerial labor market; and the market for corporate control. We present direct empirical evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in a large sample of firms. This finding suggests that crosssectional OLS regressions of firm performance on single… CONTINUE READING

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