Finding our inner scientist

@article{Gopnik2004FindingOI,
  title={Finding our inner scientist},
  author={Alison Gopnik},
  journal={Daedalus},
  year={2004},
  volume={133},
  pages={21-28}
}
  • A. Gopnik
  • Published 1 January 2004
  • Psychology
  • Daedalus
Popper had a fateful meeting with the philosopher of language Ludwig Wittgenstein at the Cambridge Philosophy Club. In a talk to the Club, with Wittgenstein in the audience, Popper described several “philosophical problems”– important, dif1⁄2cult questions that he thought would one day be answered. Here Popper was issuing a direct challenge to Wittgenstein, who had argued that philosophy could only analyze linguistic puzzles–not solve any real problems. The visit has become most famous for the… 
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