Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don't Add Up

@inproceedings{Benabbou2020FindingFA,
  title={Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don't Add Up},
  author={Nawal Benabbou and Mithun Chakraborty and Ayumi Igarashi and Yair Zick},
  booktitle={SAGT},
  year={2020}
}
  • Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, +1 author Yair Zick
  • Published in SAGT 2020
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • In this paper, we present new results on the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents that have monotone, submodular, non-additive valuation functions over bundles. Despite their simple structure, these agent valuations are a natural model for several real-world domains. We show that, if such a valuation function has binary marginal gains, a socially optimal (i.e. utilitarian social welfare-maximizing) allocation that achieves envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) exists and is… CONTINUE READING
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