Finding Closure for Safety

  title={Finding Closure for Safety},
  author={Moritz Schulz},
There are two plausible constraints on knowledge: (i) knowledge is closed under competent deduction; and (ii) knowledge answers to a safety condition. However, various authors, including Kvanvig (2004), Murphy (2005, 2006) and Alspector-Kelly (2011), argue that beliefs competently deduced from knowledge can sometimes fail to be safe. This paper responds that one can uphold (i) and (ii) by relativizing safety to methods and argues further that in order to do so, methods should be individuated… Expand
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