Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests

Abstract

Consider n players, engaged in a repeated play of a finite game in strategic (normal) form. Every player assumes that each of the other players is using a stationary (i.e., time independent) mixed strategy. The players observe the actions taken in previous stages, update their beliefs about their opponents' strategies, and choose myopic pure best responses against these beliefs. In a ``Fictitious Play,'' proposed by Brown [1], every article no. 0014

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@inproceedings{Monderer1996FictitiousPP, title={Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests}, author={Dov Monderer and Vijay Krishna and Aner Sela}, year={1996} }