Feasible Multilateralism and the E ff ects of Regionalism

  title={Feasible Multilateralism and the E ff ects of Regionalism},
  author={Emanuel Ornelas},
Recent research has underlined the efficiency of the GATT/WTO rules from the standpoint of politically motivated governments, emphasizing that the current multilateral rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefÞcient. Global free trade, in particular, is generally unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, provided that governments have distributive motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade… CONTINUE READING

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