We present a new protocol for maliciously secure two-party computation based on cut-and-choose of garbled circuits using the recent idea of “forge-and-loose”, which eliminates around a factor 3 of garbled circuits that needs to be constructed and evaluated. Our protocol introduces a new way to realize the “forge-and-loose” approach, which avoids an auxiliary secure two-party computation protocol, does not rely on any number theoretic assumptions and parallelizes well in a same instruction, multiple data (SIMD) framework. With this approach we prove our protocol universally composable-secure against a malicious adversary assuming access to oblivious transfer, commitment and coin-tossing functionalities in the random oracle model. Finally, we construct, and benchmark, a SIMD implementation of this protocol using a GPU as a massive SIMD device. The findings compare favorably with all previous implementations of maliciously secure, two-party computation.