Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees

  title={Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees},
  author={Daphne Koller and Nimrod Megiddo and Bernhard von Stengel},
  booktitle={STOC '94},
Interactions among agents can be conveniently described by game trees. In order to analyze a game, it is important to derive optimal (or equilibrium) strategies for the different players. The standard approach to finding such strategies in games with imperfect information is, in general, computationally intractable. The approach is to generate the normal form of the game (the matrix containing the payoff for each strategy combination), and then solve a linear program (LP) or a linear… 
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