Fast Convergence in Population Games

  title={Fast Convergence in Population Games},
  author={Itai Arieli Peyton Young},
  • Itai Arieli Peyton Young
  • Published 2011
A stochastic learning dynamic exhibits fast convergence in a population game if the expected waiting time until the process comes near a Nash equilibrium is bounded above for all sufficiently large populations. We propose a novel family of learning dynamics that exhibits fast convergence for a large class of population games that includes coordination games, potential games, and supermodular games as special cases. These games have the property that, from any initial state, there exists a… CONTINUE READING

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