False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

Abstract

In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can participate in a mechanism multiple times under different identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how… (More)
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3

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@article{Wagman2014FalsenameproofVW, title={False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives}, author={Liad Wagman and Vincent Conitzer}, journal={Int. J. Game Theory}, year={2014}, volume={43}, pages={599-618} }