False-Positive Psychology

  title={False-Positive Psychology},
  author={Joseph P. Simmons and Leif D. Nelson and Uri Simonsohn},
  journal={Psychological Science},
  pages={1359 - 1366}
In this article, we accomplish two things. First, we show that despite empirical psychologists’ nominal endorsement of a low rate of false-positive findings (≤ .05), flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting dramatically increases actual false-positive rates. In many cases, a researcher is more likely to falsely find evidence that an effect exists than to correctly find evidence that it does not. We present computer simulations and a pair of actual experiments that demonstrate how… 

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