Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions

  title={Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions},
  author={J. Stanley},
In this paper Jason Stanley challenge the claim made by Lewis that the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ gives the best explanation for the oddity caused by the claim made by falibilism. Stanley explains the oddity of falibilism without embracing contextualism. Thus, he appeals to a knowledge account of assertion to conclude that the contextualist motivation presupposed by Lewis is not so compelling, since it is not necessary to appeal to semantics in order to explain the oddity of falibilism. 
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