Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge

@inproceedings{Holliday2015FallibilismAM,
  title={Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge},
  author={W. Holliday},
  year={2015}
}
Being a fallibilist isn’t easy. A fallibilist about empirical knowledge, in Lewis’s (1996) sense, holds that an agent can know a contingent empirical proposition P , even if she has not ruled out every last way that P could be false.1 In this sense, it seems that most contemporary epistemologists are fallibilists, at least relative to some way of understanding what it is to “rule out” an alternative. And with good reason: if knowing a contingent empirical proposition P required ruling out every… Expand

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    Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge (Extended Version)
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    The chapter first identifies a problem for the standard picture: fallibilists working with this picture cannot maintain even the most uncontroversial epistemic closure principles without making extreme assumptions about the ability of humans to know empirical truths without empirical investigation. Expand
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    • 2015
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    This paper introduces models for epistemic logic based on Lewis’s models for counterfactuals that correspond closely to the pictures of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge in epistemology, and gives an exact characterization of the closure properties of knowledge according to these theories, as formalized. Expand
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