Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols

@article{Makarov2007FakedSA,
  title={Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols},
  author={Vadim Makarov and Johannes Skaar},
  journal={Quantum Inf. Comput.},
  year={2007},
  volume={8},
  pages={622-635}
}
In quantum cryptosystems, variations in detector efficiency can be exploited to stage a successful attack. This happens when the efficiencies of Bob's two detectors are different functions of a control parameter accessible to Eve (e.g., timing of the incoming pulses). It has previously been shown that the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is vulnerable to this attack. In this paper, we show that several other protocols and encodings may also be vulnerable. We consider a faked states attack… 

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