Fake Barns and Our Epistemological Theorizing

@article{Rodrguez2018FakeBA,
  title={Fake Barns and Our Epistemological Theorizing},
  author={{\'A}ngel Garc{\'i}a Rodr{\'i}guez},
  journal={Critica-revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofia},
  year={2018},
  volume={50},
  pages={29-53}
}
espanolLa epistemologia de virtudes pura se enfrenta al reto de los falsos graneros. Este articulo explica como superarlo. Asi, se constata que el experimento mental es ambiguo respecto de la habilidad visual tipicamente atribuida, o negada, a los sujetos del ejemplo. La desambiguacion muestra que dichos sujetos tienen conocimiento limitado de la proposicion relevante (v.g., que hay un granero enfrente). Esto casa con la epistemologia de virtudes pura, que predice y explica todas las… 

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