Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game.

  title={Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game.},
  author={Martin A. Nowak and Karen M. Page and Karl Sigmund},
  volume={289 5485},
In the Ultimatum Game, two players are offered a chance to win a certain sum of money. All they must do is divide it. The proposer suggests how to split the sum. The responder can accept or reject the deal. If the deal is rejected, neither player gets anything. The rational solution, suggested by game theory, is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible share and for the responder to accept it. If humans play the game, however, the most frequent outcome is a fair share. In this paper, we… 

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