Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms

@article{Nesterov2017FairnessAE,
  title={Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms},
  author={Alexander S. Nesterov},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  year={2017},
  volume={170},
  pages={145-168}
}
  • Alexander S. Nesterov
  • Published 2017
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • I consider the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are absent and an outside option may exist. I study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness, and (3) ordinal… CONTINUE READING
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