Corpus ID: 117057966

Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: Three impossibility results

@inproceedings{Nesterov2014FairnessAE,
  title={Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment: Three impossibility results},
  author={Alexander S. Nesterov},
  year={2014}
}
  • Alexander S. Nesterov
  • Published 2014
  • Mathematics
  • This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) Ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness and (3) ordinal efficiency and… CONTINUE READING
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