• Computer Science
  • Published in AAAI 2012

Fairness and Welfare Through Redistribution When Utility Is Transferable

@inproceedings{Cavallo2012FairnessAW,
  title={Fairness and Welfare Through Redistribution When Utility Is Transferable},
  author={Ruggiero Cavallo},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2012}
}
We join the goals of two giant and related fields of research in group decision-making that have historically had little contact: fair division, and efficient mechanism design with monetary payments. To do this we adopt the standard mechanism design paradigm where utility is assumed to be quasilinear and thus transferable across agents. We generalize the traditional binary criteria of envy-freeness, proportionality, and efficiency (welfare) to measures of degree that range between 0 and 1. We… CONTINUE READING

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