• Corpus ID: 218628851

Fair and Efficient Allocations under Subadditive Valuations

@inproceedings{Chaudhury2021FairAE,
  title={Fair and Efficient Allocations under Subadditive Valuations},
  author={Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury and Jugal Garg and Ruta Mehta},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2021}
}
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with subadditive valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to any good (EFX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of indivisible goods. Although the existence of EFX is not known beyond the simple case of two agents with subadditive valuations, some good approximations of EFX are known to exist, namely $\tfrac{1}{2}$-EFX allocation and EFX allocations with bounded charity. Nash… 
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