Fair Two-Party Computations via Bitcoin Deposits

@article{Andrychowicz2014FairTC,
  title={Fair Two-Party Computations via Bitcoin Deposits},
  author={Marcin Andrychowicz and Stefan Dziembowski and Daniel Malinowski and Lukasz Mazurek},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year={2014},
  volume={2013},
  pages={837}
}
We show how the Bitcoin currency system (with a small modification) can be used to obtain fairness in any two-party secure computation protocol in the following sense: if one party aborts the protocol after learning the output then the other party gets a financial compensation (in bitcoins). One possible application of such protocols is the fair contract signing: each party is forced to complete the protocol, or to pay to the other one a fine. 
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143 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
7
Background Citations
55
Methods Citations
22
Results Citations
2

143 Citations

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