Fair Majority Voting (or How to Eliminate Gerrymandering)

  title={Fair Majority Voting (or How to Eliminate Gerrymandering)},
  author={Michel Balinski},
  journal={The American Mathematical Monthly},
  pages={113 - 97}
  • M. Balinski
  • Published 1 February 2008
  • Political Science
  • The American Mathematical Monthly
1. THE PROBLEM. Something is rotten in the electoral state of the United States. Mathematics is involved. Advances in computer technology—hardware and software— have permitted a great leap “forward” in the fine art of political gerrymandering—“the practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength” (according to Black’s Law Dictionary). It is generally… 
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  • Directeur de Recherche de classe exceptionnelle of the CNRS at the École Polytechnique, Paris. He has enjoyed short-term appointments elsewhere,
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