Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons

  title={Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons},
  author={Hallvard Lillehammer},
  journal={The Journal of Ethics},
This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised. 
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