• Corpus ID: 170834415

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast

  title={Fact, Fiction, and Forecast},
  author={Nelson Goodman},
liELsoN Goodman's second book,1 which represents?excepting the first chapter, a reprint of the well-known paper, "The Prob lem of Counterfactual Conditionals"?the "Special Lectures in Philosophy" he delivered at the University of London in 1953, is small in volume but rich in content. There is a clear thread run ning through its four chapters: counterf actual conditionals (which in recent years have given such headaches to several ana lytic philosophers) speak about possible non-actual 2 events… 

Fiction, Counterfactuals: The Challenge for Logic

  • Brian Hill
  • Philosophy
    Special Sciences and the Unity of Science
  • 2012
It is argued that logicians are not treating the correct problem because they assume in their logics an exogenous factor, whereas what is required is an understanding of this factor and the value it takes.


One of the fundamental problems in the fields of inductive logic and the philosophy of science is the one concerning inferences or projections containing so-called "grue-like" or "pathological"

Evidence, Significance, and Counterfactuals: Schramm on the New Riddle of Induction

In a recent paper in this journal, Schramm (Erkenntnis 79:571–591, 2014) presents what he takes to be an answer to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. His solution relies on the technical notion of

Laws, Modalities and Counterfactuals

There is a close-knit complex of philosophical problems which has been with us since antiquity. These problems involve such concepts as potentiality and disposition; necessity, actuality, and

In Memoriam: Nelson Goodman 1906–1998

  • J. Ullian
  • History
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
  • 1999
Nelson Goodman, analytic philosopher of science and of the arts who made seminal contributions in a striking variety of areas, died November 25, 1998, in Needham,Massachusetts. He was 92. Goodman was

The Paradoxes of Confirmation

There are those who think philosophers have already spilled more ink on the paradoxes of confirmation than they are worth, others who think them among the deepest conceptual knots in the foundations

Who commits the base rate fallacy?

  • I. Levi
  • Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1983
processes. On our reading, this is the force of much of the recent work on reasoning. Cohen's claim that a theory of competence is all one needs for a theory of reasoning may also rest on an

The Hypothetico-Deductive Model of Scientific Theories: A Sympathetic Disclaimer

The major philosophical points I wish to make in this essay are not fully original, although I hope that what I have to say makes a coherent and persuasive whole. I shall be discussing a

The Goodman-Kripke Paradox

The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds


The principal concern of this dissertation is whether or not a conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of causation can be provided. In chapters two and three I show that two of the most