Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War

  title={Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War},
  author={Austin Carson},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={103 - 131}
  • Austin Carson
  • Published 5 October 2015
  • Sociology
  • International Organization
Abstract States pursue their cooperative and competitive goals using both public and private policy tools. Yet there is a profound mismatch between the depth, variety, and importance of covert activity and what scholars of International Relations (IR) know about it. This article addresses this gap by analyzing how adversaries struggle for influence within the covert sphere, why they often retreat to it, and when they abandon it. It focuses on secrecy among adversaries intervening in local… 
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