Extremity of Vice and the Character of Evil

  title={Extremity of Vice and the Character of Evil},
  author={P. Barry},
  journal={Journal of Philosophical Research},
  • P. Barry
  • Published 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Journal of Philosophical Research
  • It is plausible that being an evil person is a matter of having a particularly morally depraved character. I argue that suffering from extreme moral vices—and not consistently lacking moral vices, for example—suffices for being evil. Alternatively, I defend an extremity account concerning evil personhood against consistency accounts of evil personhood. After clarifying what it is for vices to be extreme, I note that the extremity thesis I defend allows that a person could suffer from both… CONTINUE READING
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