Extracting Godl [sic] from the Salt Mines: Ethereum Miners Extracting Value

  title={Extracting Godl [sic] from the Salt Mines: Ethereum Miners Extracting Value},
  author={Julien Piet and Jaiden Fairoze and Nicholas C. Weaver},
Cryptocurrency miners have great latitude in deciding which transactions they accept, including their own, and the order in which they accept them. Ethereum miners in particular use this flexibility to collect MEV—Miner Extractable Value— by structuring transactions to extract additional revenue. Ethereum also contains numerous bots that attempt to obtain MEV based on public-but-not-yet-confirmed transactions. Private relays shelter operations from these selfsame bots by directly submitting… 

An Empirical Study on Ethereum Private Transactions and the Security Implications

Large- scale private transaction datasets are collected and analysis on their characteristics, transaction costs and miner profits, as well as security impacts are performed, providing deep insights on different aspects of private transactions.

Uncle Maker: (Time)Stamping Out The Competition in Ethereum

An attack on Ethereum’s consensus mechanism which can be used by miners to obtain consistently higher mining rewards compared to the honest protocol is presented, and it is found that this is the first case of a confirmed consensus-level manipulation performed on a major cryptocurrency.

A flash(bot) in the pan: measuring maximal extractable value in private pools

This paper measures the popularity of Flashbots and evaluates if it is meeting its chartered goals and finds that Flashbots miners account for over 99.9% of the hashing power in the Ethereum network.

SoK: MEV Countermeasures: Theory and Practice

This paper presents a comprehensive taxonomy of 28 proposed MEV countermeasures, covering four different technical directions, and empirically studied the most popular MEV-auction-based solution with rich blockchain and mempool data.

AI Ethics on Blockchain: Topic Analysis on Twitter Data for Blockchain Security

This research applied natural language processing (NLP) methods to comprehensively analyze topics in tweets on MEV, and shows that the tweets discussed profound topics of ethical concern, including security, equity, emotional sentiments, and the desire for solutions to MEV.

The Evolution Of Centralisation on Cryptocurrency Platforms

This paper study the concept of centralisation in cryptocurrencies using a wide array of methodologies from the complex systems literature on a comparative collection of blockchains to define the many different levels a blockchain system may display (de-)centralisation.

Greedy Transaction Fee Mechanisms for (Non-)myopic Miners

This work moves beyond the myopic model to a model where users offer transaction fees for their transaction to be accepted, as well as report their urgency level by specifying the time to live (TTL) of the transaction, after which it expires.



Estimating (Miner) Extractable Value is Hard, Let’s Go Shopping!

It is shown that there is no globally unique MEV / EV which can readily be determined, and that a narrow definition of MEV fails to capture the extractable value of other actors like users, or the probabilistic nature of permissionless cryptocurrencies.

Analyzing and Preventing Sandwich Attacks in Ethereum

A large-scale analysis of sandwich attacks for a time period of twelve months found that during this time there were at least 480’276 attacks leading to an accumulated profit of 64’217 ETH (189’311’716 USD) and it is shown that miners have recently begun to play a more active role in these value extractions which drastically changes the patterns the authors observe.

Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum Blockchain

A largescale analysis on more than 11M blocks is performed and identifies almost 200K attacks with an accumulated profit of 18.41M USD for the attackers, providing evidence that frontrunning is both, lucrative and a prevalent issue.

Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest?

This work allows to quantity the BEV danger by deriving the USD extracted from sandwich attacks, liquidations, and decentralized exchange arbitrage, and formalize and analyze emerging BEV relay systems, where miners accept BEV transactions from a centralized relay server instead of the peer-to-peer (P2P) network.

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability

This work highlights the large, complex risks created by transaction-ordering dependencies in smart contracts and the ways in which traditional forms of financial-market exploitation are adapting to and penetrating blockchain economies.

Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value

It is found that Cross-Domain MEV can be used to measure the incentive for transaction sequencers in different domains to collude with one another, and study the scenarios in which there exists such an incentive.

A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges

It is shown that DEX arbitrage and trade routing among similar AMMs can be performed efficiently and atomically onchain within smart contracts, leading to less stale blocks and better blockchain security.

On the Just-In-Time Discovery of Profit-Generating Transactions in DeFi Protocols

This paper investigates two methods that allow us to automatically create profitable DeFi trades, one well-suited to arbitrage and the other applicable to more complicated settings, and quantifies the value threshold at which a profitable transaction qualifies as Miner Extractable Value (MEV) and would incentivize MEV-aware miners to fork the blockchain.

FairMM: A Fast and Frontrunning-Resistant Crypto Market-Maker

This work proposes a market-maker-based crypto-token exchange, which is both more efficient than existing solutions and offers provable resistance to frontrunning attack, and proposes novel light-weight cryptographic tools and smart-contract-enforced incentives to eliminate reordering attacks.

Eliminating Sandwich Attacks with the Help of Game Theory

It is unveiled that most broadcasted transactions can avoid sandwich attacks while simultaneously only experiencing a low risk of transaction failure, and it is demonstrated that a constant auto-slippage cannot adjust to varying trade sizes and pool characteristics.