Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth : A Dynamic Game Analysis

  title={Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth : A Dynamic Game Analysis},
  author={Herbert Dawid and Gustav Feichtinger and Antal Novak},
In this paper we use a di erential game analysis to study the dynamic strategic interaction between a criminal gang extorting money from local shop-owners and the local police force. In particular, we are interested in characterizing which factors are important in determining whether the capital stock of local shop-owners keeps growing in spite of extortion or the criminal activity leads to a phase of stagnation of the local economy. A Markov perfect equilibrium of the game is characterized in… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Topics from this paper.


Publications citing this paper.


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 10 references

Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory

  • T. Basar, G. J. Olsder
  • 1995
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

The Economics of Organized Crime

  • G. Fiorentini, S. Peltzman
  • 1995
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

Credible Threats in Extortion

  • K. Konrad, S. Skaperdas
  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
  • 1997
2 Excerpts

Observations on the Development of Small Private Enterprises in Russia

  • A. Anders
  • Post-Soviet Geography and Economics,
  • 1997
2 Excerpts

Optimal Allocation of Drug Control E orts: A Di erential Game Analysis

  • H. Dawid, G. Feichtinger
  • Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,
  • 1996

Conspiracy Among the Many: the Ma a in Legitimate Industries', in Fiorentini and Peltzman

  • D. Gambetta, P. Reuter
  • 1995
1 Excerpt

Environmentalists versus Resources Exploiters: A Dynamic Game Analysis' in V.G.L

  • G. Feichtinger, E. J. Dockner
  • Paredes (Ed.), International Symposium on Systems…
  • 1994
2 Excerpts

A Dynamic Variant of the Battle of the Sexes

  • G. Feichtinger, F. Wirl
  • International Journal of Game Theory,
  • 1993
1 Excerpt

Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society, University of California Press, Berkeley

  • M. Jankowski
  • 1991
1 Excerpt

The Feedback Equilibria of a Di erential Game

  • K. Shimomura
  • 1991
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…