External threats and political survival: Can dispute involvement deter coup attempts?

  title={External threats and political survival: Can dispute involvement deter coup attempts?},
  author={Cemal Eren Arbatlı and Ekim Arbatli},
  journal={Conflict Management and Peace Science},
  pages={115 - 152}
Diversionary war theory holds that insecure leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies than their more secure counterparts. This hypothesis rests on the premise that interstate dispute involvement helps leaders deter potential challenges against their rule. We offer strong support for this premise by looking at coup attempts. Cross-national time-series evidence from interstate dispute participation over the period 1960–2000 indicates that a country in a militarized… 
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